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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------

X

5/22/19

KEVIN DOWNS,
Plaintiff,

18-cv-10337 (JSR)

-vMEMORANDUM ORDER
OATH INC.,
Defendant.
-----------------------------------

X

JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
Plaintiff Kevin Downs brings a one-count complaint against
defendant Oath Inc. Now before the Court are the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment. Downs moves for summary judgment
on the issue of liability, and Oath moves for summary judgment
on its defense of statutory immunity under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. For the reasons below, Downs's motion
is denied, Oath's motion is granted, and the case is dismissed.
Background

Kevin Downs is a professional photographer who does
freelance work for the New York Daily News. Defendant Oath
Inc.'s Response to Plaintiff's Statement Pursuant to Local Rule
56.1, at i 1 ("Oath 56.1 Counterstatement"), ECF No. 35. Oath
Inc. is the owner and operator of HuffPost, which is a media
brand with a website at www.huffingtonpost.com. Plaintiff's
Opposition to Defendant's Statement Pursuant to Rule 56.1, at

i 2 ("Downs 56.1 Counterstatement"), ECF No. 39.
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On January 29, 2017, Downs photographed a group of
individuals at JFK Airport who were protesting President Trump's
"Travel Ban" (i.e., Executive Order 13769). Oath 56.1
Counterstatement 1 20. On the same day, Downs licensed his
photograph to the New York Daily News, which published it with
an article titled "Federal judge grants emergency stay to thwart
Trump's refugee ban and halt deportations." Id. 1 23. The next
day, an article was posted to www.huffingtonpost.com with the
title: "Trump's Disastrous Week of Presidency: The Chinese
Exclusion Act and the Muslim Ban." Id. 1 24. The article - which
contained commercial advertisements - used Downs's photograph
without his permission. Id. 11 25, 26, 35.
The article was not written by a HuffPost employee;
instead, it was written and uploaded by Grace Ji-Sun Kim, who
was a participant on HuffPost's "contributor" platform. Id.
1 29. The contributor platform, which HuffPost operated between
2005 and 2018, included over 100,000 contributors who selfpublished blog posts. Downs 56.1 Counterstatement 11 3, 8.
Contributors were neither employed nor paid by HuffPost, and
they were able to publish articles directly on HuffPost without
editorial review.

Id. 11 4, 9. Contributors were required to

agree to terms and conditions prohibiting them from uploading
copyrighted material, id. 11 6-7, and after articles were
2
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published, HuffPost editors would screen them for offensive or
illegal content, Oath 56.1 Counterstatement

~

7. HuffPost

editors would also index articles, change articles' headlines,
and copy edit articles' text. Id.
The day after Kim posted her article, a HuffPost editor
named Chloe Cohn screened the article for offensive or unlawful
content. Downs 56.1 Counterstatement

~

24. Cohn also added

content tags to the article's metadata and a "related video"
link beneath the article. Id. According to Victor Brand, who was
Standards Editor for HuffPost at the time the article was
published, the edit history of the article shows that the
article included Downs's photograph at the time Kim uploaded it.
Brand Deel.

~

9, ECF No. 26. The edit history also shows that

Cohn did not edit the text of Kim's article. Id.

~

15. Attached

to Brand's declaration are screenshots of the article's edit
history that support his statements. See ECF No. 26, Ex. 3.
Downs registered his copyright in his photograph on January
2, 2018, Oath 56.1 Counterstatement

~

45, and he filed the

instant action on November 7, 2018, ECF No. 1. Downs brings a
single claim for copyright infringement. ECF No. 11, at~~ 1519. Oath answered and raised a battery of affirmative defenses,
including, as relevant here, statutory immunity under the

3
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act

("DMCA"), absence of volitional

conduct, fair use, and laches. ECF No. 15, at 11 2-18.
Now before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment. Downs moves for summary judgment on the issue
of liability, and he also moves to dismiss Oath's affirmative
defenses. ECF No. 27. Oath moves for summary judgment on its
statutory immunity defense. ECF No. 22. Each party opposes the
other's motion. ECF Nos. 34, 38.
Standard of Review

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
"court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "The movant
bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
dispute of fact, and, to award summary judgment, the court must
be able to find after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of a non-movant that no reasonable trier of fact could find in
favor of that party." Palmer/Kane LLC v. Rosen Book Works LLC,
204 F. Supp. 3d 565, 568

(S.D.N.Y. 2016) . 1 "[T]here is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases all internal
quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes, and citations
are omitted.

1

4
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nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.
If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
Analysis

To establish copyright infringement, "two elements must be
proven:

(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of

constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991). The parties agree that Downs has satisfied both of these
elements. However, the parties dispute whether Oath is
nevertheless entitled to immunity under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c),
which is one of the "safe harbor" provisions in the DMCA. 2
Under§ 512(c), service providers may avoid liability for
copyright infringement that occurs "by reason of the storage at
the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider."
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1). As relevant here, § 512(c) 's safe harbor
applies only if a service provider:
(A)

(i) does not have actual
knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing;

Because the Court finds that Oath is entitled to statutory
immunity, it does not address Oath's other affirmative defenses.

2

5
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(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is
not aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement .
. ,
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity.
Id.
Oath argues that it has satisfied each of the above
requirements (as well as other requirements not at issue here)
and that it is therefore entitled to immunity as a matter of
law. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment Regarding Entitlement to DMCA Safe Harbor 6-17
("Oath SJ Mem."), ECF No. 23; Defendant Oath Inc.'s Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
on Liability Against Defendant for Copyright Infringement under
17 U.S.C. § 501, at 6-18

("Oath SJ Opp."), ECF No. 34. Downs

argues that Oath has failed to meet its burden - and, indeed,
has failed to create a triable issue - as to three of the above
requirements. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability Against Defendant for
6

Case 1:18-cv-10337-JSR Document 43 Filed 05/22/19 Page 7 of 22

Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, at 8-12
Mem."), ECF No.

("Downs SJ

28; Memorandum of Law in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding DMCA Safe
Harbor 5-10

("Downs SJ Opp."), ECF No.

38.

3

First, Downs argues, the infringement here did not occur
"by reason of .
U.S.C.

§

storage at the direction of a user," 17

501(c)(l), because Cohn, rather than Kim, was

responsible for publication of the HuffPost article with Downs's
photograph. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability Against
Defendant for Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, at
4-6

("Downs SJ Reply"), ECF No.

42. Second, Downs argues, Cohn

was "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity [wa]s apparent," 17 U.S.C.

§

512(c) (1) (A) (ii)

- i.e.,

Cohn had "red flag" knowledge of infringement - because the
photograph in Kim's article had a New York Daily News photo

Downs argued in his moving and opposition papers that Oath
failed to designate or identify an agent to receive notices of
infringement, as is required by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2). See Downs
SJ Mem. 9-10; Downs SJ Opp. 5-7. This argument, however, was
predicated on a simple misunderstanding of HuffPost's ownership
history. See Oath SJ Opp. 9 (explaining that Oath did not exist
when Kim's article was posted and that AOL Inc. - HuffPost's
owner and operator at the time - had a registered DMCA agent).
Accordingly, Downs has since abandoned his argument that Oath
failed to designate or identify an agent. See Transcript dated
May 17, 2019, at 23:15-20.
3

7
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credit. See Downs SJ Opp. 9-10; Downs SJ Reply 6-7. And third,
Downs argues, HuffPost "receive[d] a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which [it]
ha[d] the right and ability to control such activity," 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (c) (1) (B), because commercial advertisements appeared on
the face of Kim's article. See Downs SJ Mem. 11-12; Downs SJ
Opp. 10.
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that
each of Downs's arguments is unavailing and Downs has failed to
create a genuine dispute as to any of the above requirements.
Accordingly, Oath is entitled to immunity as a matter of law
under the safe harbor in§ 512(c).
I.

By Reason of Storage at the Direction of a User

"The§ 512(c) safe harbor is only available when the
infringement occurs 'by reason of the storage at the direction
of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.'" Viacom
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38

(2d Cir. 2012)

(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (1)). This requirement that
infringement occur "by reason of" user storage is not intended
to place a strict "limitation on the ability of a service
provider to modify user-submitted material." Id. at 39; see id.
("[W]e conclude that§ 512(c) is clearly meant to cover more
8
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than mere electronic storage lockers."). Instead, while the safe
harbor requires some causal connection between user storage and
the alleged infringement, the Second Circuit has explained that
"the§ 512(c) safe harbor extends to software functions
performed [by the service provider] for the purpose of
facilitating access to user-stored material." Id.
Oath argues that the alleged infringement at issue here
occurred by reason of user storage because Kim added Downs's
photograph to her article. See Oath SJ Mem. 10-12; Oath SJ Opp.
9-14. Moreover, Oath contends, the safe harbor applies even
though HuffPost screened articles for offensive and illegal
content, and even though Cohn added content tags and a related
video link to Kim's article. See Oath SJ Opp. 10-12. Oath points
to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ventura Content, Ltd. v.
Motherless, Inc., in which the court held that infringement
occurred by reason of user storage even though the defendant
website operator screened out illicit and apparently infringing
material. 885 F.3d 597, 607-08

(9th Cir. 2018). Oath contrasts

Ventura with Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. Livejournal, Inc., in
which the court held that there was a triable issue as to
whether infringement occurred by reason of user storage where
the defendant website's moderators "review[ed] submissions and
publicly post[ed] only about one-third of submissions." 873 F.3d
9
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1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Kim's article was posted
directly to HuffPost and Cohn conducted only cursory screening
and modification, Oath argues, the instant case is closer to
Ventura than it is to Mavrix. See Oath SJ Opp. 11.
Downs responds that the alleged infringement did not occur
by reason of user storage. See Downs SJ Reply 4-6. First, Downs
argues, there is no evidence that Kim, rather than Cohn, added
the photograph to the article. Id. at 4. In fact, Downs
suggests, it is "likely that [Cohn] added the Photograph" to
Kim's article because Cohn also added content tags and a related
video link. Id.

(emphasis added). Second, Downs argues, even if

Kim added the photograph, Cohn "ultimately optimized and
substantively enhanced the Article.

[and] made the Article

ready for mass publication to audiences worldwide." Id. at 4-5.
Downs contends that Cohn "made editorial decisions as to what
articles were indexed and which were not," and that Kim's
article was therefore "subject to a selection process by virtue
of Cohn's optimization for Google search indexing." Id. at 5.
Beginning with the issue of who added the photograph to the
article, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it was Kim,
not Cohn. As noted above, Oath has put forth screenshots of the
article's edit history, see ECF No. 26, Ex. 3, as well as a
sworn declaration from Victor Brand, who was Standards Editor
10
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for HuffPost at the time the article was published, Brand Deel.
~

9. Downs, in opposition, has offered nothing more than

speculation that Cohn may have added the photograph because she
added a video link as well. See Downs SJ Reply 4. This is
insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether Kim added
the photograph (not to mention grossly inadequate to support
Downs's claim that Cohn "likely" added the photograph).
Moreover, while Downs complains that Oath failed to submit
supportive affidavits from Cohn and "Chin" - by whom Downs
presumably means Kim - Downs could have deposed these
individuals himself, and he chose not to. See id. at 4 n.2.
Moving to the question of whether Cohn's cursory screening
and modification place Kim's article outside of the safe
harbor's protections, the case law supports Oath's position over
Downs's. As the Tenth Circuit explained in BWP Media USA, Inc.
v. Clarity Digital Group, LLC, "if the infringing content has
merely gone through a screening or automated process, the
[service provider] will generally benefit from the safe harbor's
protection." 820 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016); see Ventura,
885 F.3d at 607-08
LoopNet,

(discussed above); cf. Costar Grp.,

Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004)

Inc. v.

(service

provider not liable for infringement where employees conducted
"cursory" reviews of user-uploaded photographs for copyrighted
11
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and irrelevant material). Mavrix - the only case on which Downs
relies - is distinguishable, as the defendant there chose a
small subset of user submissions to post publicly. 873 F.3d at
1056. Here, contributors like Kim published their articles
directly to HuffPost.
Moreover, the addition of content tags does not deprive
Oath of immunity under§ 512(c). As the Second Circuit explained
in Viacom, "the§ 512(c) safe harbor extends to software
functions performed for the purpose of facilitating access to
user-stored material." 676 F.3d at 39. This is the precise
purpose of content tags. Indeed, Viacom approvingly cited to Io
Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., in which the court held that
infringing content was stored at the direction of the user even
though the defendant website's employees sometimes added content
tags after users uploaded videos. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140,
1146-48 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Similarly, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, the Ninth Circuit held that
"§ 512(c) encompasses the access-facilitating processes that
automatically occur when a user uploads a video to [defendant's
website]," 718 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013), even though
these access-facilitating processes included the assignment of
content tags, see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.,
665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
12
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Based on these cases - and the other considerations
discussed above - the Court concludes that Downs has not created
a triable issue as to whether the alleged infringement occurred
by reason of user storage. The undisputed evidence demonstrates
that Kim added the photograph to the article. And Cohn's cursory
screening and modification of Kim's article do not place the
article outside of the protections of§ 512(c).
II.

Red Flag Knowledge

"[I]n order to be disqualified from the benefits of the
safe harbor by reason of red flag knowledge under
§ 512 (c) (1) (A) (ii), the service provider must have actually
known facts that would make the specific infringement claimed
objectively obvious to a reasonable person." Capitol Records,
LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78,

93 (2d Cir. 2016). "The

hypothetical reasonable person to whom infringement must be
obvious is an ordinary person - not endowed with specialized
knowledge or expertise concerning .

the laws of copyright."

Id. at 93-94. Moreover, while statutory immunity is an
affirmative defense, "the burden falls on the copyright owner to
demonstrate that the service provider acquired knowledge of the
infringement, or of facts and circumstances from which
infringing activity was obvious, and failed to promptly take
down the infringing matter, thus forfeiting its-right to the
13
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safe harbor." Id. at 95; see id.

("The plaintiff is, of course,

entitled to take discovery of the service provider to enable it
to make this showing.").
Downs argues that Cohn had red flag knowledge of
infringement because the photograph in Kim's article had a New
York Daily News credit. See Downs SJ Opp. 9-10; Downs SJ Reply
6-7. "It is simply not plausible," Downs contends, "that a
HuffPost professional would think that an unpaid contributor
such as Kim had authority from the Daily News

(or a professional

photojournalist) to post a photograph that was published just
one day before by HuffPost's competitor in the news industry."
Downs SJ Reply 7; see id. at 6 ("Any trained professional in
Cohn's position should have known that the photograph was
infringing based on the attribution to New York Daily News."
(capitalization omitted)).
As Oath explains, however, immunity under the DMCA's safe
harbor does not depend on whether a "HuffPost professional" or a
"trained professional in Cohn's position" would or should have
known that the photograph in Kim's article was infringing.
Instead, immunity depends on whether the infringement would have
been "obvious to a reasonable person

. not endowed with

specialized knowledge or expertise concerning .

14

. the laws of
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copyright." Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 93-94. Here, the Court
concludes that infringement would not have been so obvious.
The Court's analysis on this issue is guided by the Second
Circuit's decision in Capitol Records, which is closely on
point. There, defendant Vimeo operated a website to which users
uploaded videos. Id. at 81. Vimeo's employees would "identify
some videos with a 'like' sign, occasionally prepare commentary
on a video, offer technical assistance to users, participate in
forum discussions, and at times inspect videos suspected of
violating Vimeo's policies." Id. at 84. Unhappy with the
unauthorized use of sound recordings in user-uploaded videos,
record and music publishing companies sued Vimeo for
infringement. Id. at 81. Plaintiffs argued that Vimeo had red
flag knowledge of infringement in cases where an employee viewed
a "video containing all or virtually all of a recognizable,
copyrighted song." Id. at 93.
The Second Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument for
several reasons. As relevant here, the court explained that an
"employee's viewing might have been brief," such that the
employee did not ascertain that the video contained a
copyrighted audio recording. Id. at 96. Furthermore, the court
continued, the employee might not have been aware that the video
contained a copyrighted audio recording because the employee
15
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might have been viewing the video for "many different business
purposes," such as "classification by subject matter" or
"sampling to detect inappropriate obscenity or bigotry." Id. And
even assuming that the employee was aware of the copyrighted
recording, the court concluded that the employee could not be
expected to distinguish between infringements, on the one hand,
and fair or authorized uses, on the other. See id. at 97.
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, the Court
holds that HuffPost did not have red flag knowledge of the
alleged infringement in Kim's article. As in Capitol Records,
Cohn's viewing of Downs's photograph may have been brief. And as
in Capitol Records, Cohn was viewing Kim's article for multiple
purposes, including subject matter classification and screening
for offensive content. It is of course possible that Cohn saw
the New York Daily News photo credit, but Capitol Records makes
clear that this possibility is not enough to create a triable
issue as to red flag knowledge. Instead, "the burden £[ell] on
[Downs] to demonstrate that [Cohn] acquired knowledge of .
facts and circumstances from which infringing activity was

16
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obvious," id. at 95, and Downs failed to take discovery or
otherwise adduce evidence sufficient to make this showing.
Moreover,

4

even if Downs showed that Cohn was aware of the

New York Daily News photo credit, Capitol Records suggests that
Oath still would be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of
red flag knowledge. Although the fair use and licensing issues
raised by the inclusion of a sound recording in a video are not
identical to those raised by the inclusion of a photograph in a
blog post, the Court does not see how Cohn, any more than the
employees in Capitol Records,

could be expected to distinguish

between infringements and fair or authorized uses. Accordingly,
the Court holds that Downs has failed to create a triable issue
as to red flag knowledge.

III.

Financial Benefit and the Right and Ability to Control
"Apart from the foregoing knowledge provisions, the

§ 512(c)
must

safe harbor provides that an eligible service provider

'not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to

the infringing activity,

in a case in which the service provider

has the right and ability to control such activity.'" Viacom,

4 At argument, the only explanation Downs gave for failing to
depose Cohn was that "the burden is on [Oath] to establish [its]
defense." See Transcript dated May 17, 2019, at 5:8-9. Although
this may be true as a general matter with respect to Oath's
statutory immunity defense, Capitol Records makes clear that
Downs has the burden of proving red flag knowledge.

17
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676 F.3d at 36 (quoting 17 U.S.C.

§

512 (c) (1) (B)). Downs argues

that Oath fails to satisfy this requirement because HuffPost
received a financial benefit from the commercial advertisements
that were visible on the face of Kim's article. See Downs SJ
Mem. 12; Downs SJ Opp. 10. Furthermore, Downs contends, Oath had
the right and ability to control Kim's article because HuffPost
"engag[ed] in human supervision and review [of] content posted
to the Website." Downs SJ Mem. 13; Downs SJ Reply 8.
Both of these arguments fail. Beginning with the question
of whether HuffPost "receive[d] a financial benefit directly
attributable to the infringing activity," it is not enough for
Downs to show that HuffPost ran commercial advertisements on its
website. If that were sufficient, then practically every
revenue-generating website would satisfy the financial benefit
prong of 17 U.S.C.

§

512 (c) (1) (B).

Instead, Downs must put forth evidence of a connection
between the allegedly infringing activity and the financial
benefit that HuffPost received. In Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc. v. Fung, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
advertising revenue met the financial benefit prong where the
defendant "promoted advertising by pointing to infringing
activity; obtained advertising revenue that depended on the
number of visitors to his sites; attracted primarily visitors
18

Case 1:18-cv-10337-JSR Document 43 Filed 05/22/19 Page 19 of 22

who were seeking to engage in infringing activity .

; and

encouraged that infringing activity." 710 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2013). In Ventura, by contrast, the court held that the
financial benefit prong was not met where the defendant "did not
advertise itself as a place to get pirated materials." 885 F.3d
at 613. Although the court recognized that the more content
hosted on defendant's website, "the more users it would attract,
and more views would lead to more advertising revenue," the
court explained that "[t]he words 'the' and 'directly' in
[§ 512 (c) (1) (B)]

. must mean that some revenue has to be

distinctly attributable to the infringing material." Id.
Here, Downs has made no showing that the advertising
revenue HuffPost received was "distinctly attributable" to
infringing activity. There is no evidence that HuffPost
encouraged infringement, or that it promoted advertising by
pointing to infringement, or even that its users primarily
engaged in infringing conduct. To the contrary, the undisputed
evidence shows that HuffPost simply ran advertisements on usergenerated articles, some of which inevitably contained
infringing material. This case is thus much closer to Ventura
than it is to Fung. Indeed, the financial benefit analysis
likely favors Oath even more than it did the defendant in
Ventura, as the defendant in Ventura operated a website that
19
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hosted nearly 13 million pornographic photographs and videos
that were uploaded by users. Id. at 600. The Court suspects that
infringing content was a more significant driver of advertising
revenue on the Ventura defendant's website than it was on
HuffPost's contributor platform.
Even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that HuffPost
"receive[d] a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity," Downs has nevertheless failed to show that
HuffPost had the "right and ability to control such activity."
As the Second Circuit has explained, the "right and ability to
control" must "require[] something more than the ability to
remove or block access to materials posted on a service
provider's website." Viacom,

676 F.3d at 38. Otherwise, the

ability to remove or block access, which is a "prerequisite to
safe harbor protection under

§

512 (c) (1) (A) (iii)

the same time be a disqualifier under

§

&

(C) would at

512 (c) (1) (B)." Id. at

37. Instead, possession of the "right and ability to control"
contemplates circumstances in which "a service provider exert[s]
substantial influence on the activities of users." Id. at 38;
see Ventura, 885 F.3d at 613 ("To have the right and ability to
control, a service provider must be able to exert 'substantial
influence' on its users' activities.").

20
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Based on the evidence before the Court, Downs has failed to
create a genuine dispute as to whether HuffPost exerted
substantial influence over contributors' activities. Instead,
the undisputed evidence shows that contributors self-published
their articles directly to the website and that HuffPost engaged
in cursory screening and modification. This level of involvement
is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that HuffPost
had the "right and ability to control" infringing activity by
members of its contributor platform. Accordingly - and for the
reasons discussed above - the Court holds that Oath is not
disqualified from the DMCA's safe harbor by reason of failure to
satisfy the requirements of

§

512 (c) (1) (B)

Conclusion

In sum, the undisputed evidence shows that:

(1) the

allegedly infringing use of Downs's photograph occurred "by
reason of
§

512 (c) (1);

. storage at the direction of a user," 17 U.S.C.
(2) HuffPost was "not aware of facts or

circumstances from which infringing activity [wa]s apparent,"
id.

§

512 (c) (1) (A) (ii); and (3) Huff Post did "not receive a

financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which [it] ha[d] the right and ability to
control such activity," id.

§

512 (c) (1) (B). Downs' s motion for

21
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summary judgment is therefore denied, Oath's motion for summary
judgment is granted, and the case is hereby dismissed.
The Clerk is directed to close the entries at docket
numbers 22 and 27, and to enter judgment dismissing the case
with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, NY
May

J~,

2019
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